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Abstract:   In the year 2000, the German government passed the most ambitious tax reform 
in postwar G erman history aiming at a significant tax relief for households. Drawing on data 
of the GSOEP, we analyze the distributional and fiscal effects of the tax reform. Our analysis 
employs microsimulation techniques. Furthermore, we estimate behavioral effects  of the tax 
reform using a discrete choice labor supply model. We find that the tax reform leads to a 
significant increase of net household income. The relative gains increase with taxable income, 
thus income inequality is rising. We also find that behavioral effects reduce the revenue loss. 
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1  Introduction 
 
In the year 2000, the German government passed the most ambitious tax reform in postwar 
German history. The tax reform aims at reducing the burden and distortions of taxation for 
both companies and private households.  The change in the tax system leads to a significant 
tax relief for households; marginal tax rates are to be decreased and the base tax allowance is 
to be increased. According to estimates of the Federal Ministry of Finance 
(Bundesfinanzministerium), the tax r eform will reduce the tax burden in total by about 57 
billion  €, of which about 32 billion € is due to the reduction of personal income taxes, and the 
rest to reduction in the taxation of corporations and entrepreneurs. When the tax reform had 
been initiated at the end of the 1990’s, the prevailing view among economists and policy 
makers was that an important part of the tax reform would be self-financing by increasing 
employment and economic growth. In contrast to this widely held optimistic view, the 
opinions about the distributional effects of the tax reform have been more diverse.  
There are currently only two published empirical studies on the economic effects of 
the German tax reform 2000. Using microsimulation techniques, Merz and Zwick (2002) 
analyze  the distributional effects of the tax reform on the basis of the German Tax Statistic 
1995, which is currently the latest available wave of this data set. The authors conclude that 
due to the tax reform income inequality between households will increase. A s the analysis of 
Merz and Zwick is based on unadjusted data of the year 1995 and does not account for any 
behavioral adjustment of households following the tax reform, the results can only be seen as 
indicative of the distributional effects of the tax reform. Wagenhals (2000a) also takes into 
account potential labor supply effects of married women and concludes that the tax reform 
will lead to increasing inequality in the distribution of net household incomes, but will also 
result in an increase of married women’s labor supply  
The purpose of our paper is to provide a more detailed analysis of the distribution and 
fiscal effects of the tax reform on the basis of a behavioral microsimulation model, whereby 
we focus on the personal income tax reform. This allows us to simulate the effects of the tax 
reform 2000 which will only be fully implemented by the year 2005.  To account for 
behavioral adjustment at the household level, we estimate labor supply elasticities both with 
respect to labor force participation and hours worked on the basis of a household labor supply 
model. The microsimulation model is based on the latest wave of the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP), which includes a disproportionately large subsample of high-
income households. Given that a very large share of the income tax is borne by the upper   2 
income decile, the representation of this group is of great importance for the analysis of the 
distributional and fiscal effects of the tax reform. In our empirical analysis we also control for 
bracket creeping, which has been neglected in previous studies of the distributional effects of 
tax reforms. Bracket creeping measures the real increase of household's tax payment due to a 
purely inflation related increase of the taxable income. As we will demonstrate, this effect 
reduces the cash gain of the tax reform significantly.  
We find that the cumulated impact of the tax reform 2000 amounts to a real average 
increase of yearly net household income by about 850  €. This implies a relative increase of 
the net household income on average by 3.29%. Our results indicate an increasing inequality 
due to the tax reform that results form higher relative gains of households in the upper deciles 
of the income distribution. We find that the increase in labor supply induced by the tax reform 
reduces the loss in tax revenues by about 2 billion  €. Our simulation results show that the total 
loss of personal income tax revenue amounts to approximately 33 billion €. 
In the next section we briefly describe the German tax reform 2000. In section 3 we 
present the simulation methodology employed in this paper to estimate the distributional and 
fiscal effects of the tax reform. Section 4 contains the simulation results of the distributional 
and fiscal effects of the tax reform, where we also discuss differences between simulations 
with and without behavioral adjustment. The final section summarizes the main results of the 
paper and contains some conclusions. 
 
2  The German Personal Income Tax Reform 2000 
On July 6
th 2000, the German government passed the law to implement the German personal 
income tax reform 2000. The central purpose of this reform is to stimulate private 
consumption and investment to foster economic growth and thus to increase employment 
(Bundesfinanzministerium 2003). In addition, it is the goal to reduce the distortional effects of 
high marginal tax rates on labor supply. According to calculations of the Federal Ministry of 
Finance the personal income tax reform will result in a total tax relief of households by 
approximately 32 billion  €. In addition, due to changes in the taxation of corporations and 
entrepreneurs tax revenues are reduced by approximately 25 billion  €. A large share of the 
overall tax reduction is expected to be compensated by a broadening of the tax base,   3 
especially by reducing certain tax allowances for firms. In this paper, we are only concerned 
with changes in the taxation of personal income.
1 
The tax reform 2000 was implemented in three steps. By 2005, the top marginal tax 
rate is to be reduced t o 42%, compared to 51% in 2000. In the same period, the lowest 
marginal tax rate decreases by 7.9 percentage points from 22.9% to 15%, while the basic tax 
allowance is increased from 6902  € to 7664 € amounting to an increase of 762 €. The 
development of marginal tax rates at the top and the bottom of the income distribution as well 
as the basic tax allowance over this period is documented in the following figure. 




















The political process of implementing the three steps of the tax reform has turned out to be 
quite cumbersome. As planned, the first step was implemented on January 1
st in 2001. 
However, the second step, scheduled for the beginning of 2003 was postponed by one year, to 
compensate unexpected state expenditures that resulted from a massive flood catastrophe in 
summer 2002. Furthermore, in order to stimulate the economy the government intended to 
combine the second and third step of the tax reform and to implement this combined step 
jointly at January 1
st in 2004. However, the opposition holding the majority in the upper 
house of parliament ( Bundesrat) rejected this intention and eventually a compromise, a 
                                        
1   A detailed descriptions of the German tax reform 2000 is contained in Bundesfinanzministerium (2003); for a 
critical review see, e.g., Homburg (2000).   4 
mixture between the initially planned second and third step of the reform, was introduced in 
2004, while the last step will become effective at the beginning of 2005. 
 
3  Simulation Methodology 
In the empirical public finance literature one major focus of interest has been on labor supply 
decisions resulting from changes in tax reforms (Eissa 1996, Moffitt and Wilhelm 2000). 
Feldstein (1995), however, suggested instead analyzing changes in the taxable income, as 
taxable income measures all relevant decisions of individuals. Employing this broader 
measure of behavioral adjustment, he finds significantly larger behavioral effects due to 
changes in the tax function than previous studies only focusing on labor supply effects. 
Following Feldstein, an important literature emerged, known as the new tax responsiveness 
literature (Goolsbee 2000). Drawing on this literature, it would seem more appropriate to 
focus on changes in taxable income, as this adjustment captures the total behavioral impact of 
the German tax reform.   However, at this stage, we only concentrate on the impact of the tax 
reform on labor supply. The reason for this more limited analysis is the lack of sufficient 
information on potential sources influencing the taxable income in the employed data set. 
Hence, our estimates of the behavioral adjustment of households have to be considered as 
lower bound results of the effect of the analyzed tax reform as far as behavioral responses 
affect the distribution of incomes and tax receipts. 
It is important to stress that the analysis of changes in the tax function has to be based 
on an ex ante evaluation approach since the 2000 tax reform will only be fully phased in by 
the year 2005. Since this reform differs substantially from previous tax reforms in Germany in 
terms of both, the size of the tax cuts across the income distribution, as well as the 
macroeconomic situation, empirical estimates of the effects of previous reforms (see, e.g., van 
Essen, Kaiser and Spahn 1988, Kaiser, Spahn and van Essen 1992, Wagenhals 2000b) are of 
little use for an evaluation of the reform analyzed here. We therefore employ a behavioral 
microsimulation model, which combines a detailed tax-benefit simulation model with an 
econometrically estimated household labor supply model on the basis of household data for 
Germany, as described below. 
 
Data and Sample Design 
The tax-benefit microsimulation model for Germany employed in our analysis is based on 
micro data of the latest wave of the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP). The GSOEP is 
a representative sample of private households living in Germany with detailed information on   5 
household incomes, hours worked and household structure.
2 The dataset includes detailed 
information about the socio-economic situation of over 11,000 households that represent 38.8 
million households living in Germany.
3 The latest available wave of the GSOEP is for 2002, 
which, for the first time, contains a disproportionately large sample of high-income 
households.
4 This so-called  high-income sample consists of over 1,200 households with 
monthly net incomes of at least 3,750  €. Given that the highest decile of taxable income 
contributes roughly 40% to the overall collected amount of personal income tax (table 8), the 
inclusion of this group in the analysis is of greatest importance. The overrepresentation of this 
group in our sample is accounted for by adjusting estimation results by appropriate weighting 
factors available in the GSOEP. A detailed description of the structure of the high-income 
sample and the weighting factors is provided by Schupp et al. (2003).  
 
Tax Benefit Simulation Model 
In theory, the German income tax is based on the principle of comprehensive income taxation. 
That is, the sum of a household’s incomes from all sources is taxed at a single rate after 
several deductions have been applied to arrive at the tax base. In practice, there are various 
exceptions to this rule, however, especially regarding the taxation of capital income and 
pensions. Another distinguishing feature of the German tax system is the principle of joint 
taxation of households, whereby the income tax of a married couple is calculated by applying 
the tax function to half of the sum of the spouses’ incomes; this amount is then doubled to 
determine the tax amount of the couple. 
Our tax-benefit simulation model (STMS) includes all relevant components of the 
German tax and  transfer system.
5 For the majority of households the most important income 
component is earnings from dependent employment. For employed people, information on 
gross monthly earnings in the month before the interview is collected in the GSOEP. This 
information together with the information on weekly hours worked is used to calculate gross 
hourly wages. Hypothetical yearly earnings for each of the hours categories defined below are 
calculated by multiplying gross hourly earnings by the respective average number of working 
hours in each category used in our household labor supply model. For employed persons, it is 
                                        
2   A description of the GSOEP can be downloaded from www.diw.de/soep; see also Haisken-DeNew and Frick 
(2001). 
3    For more information about the weighting, see Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2001). 
4   Although we use data from the year 2002, simulations are undertaken for the year 2001. The reason is that 
most income variables we use are retrospective variables that refer to the year 2001. 
5   A detailed description of the tax-benefit simulation model may be obtained by the authors upon request.   6 
assumed that the individual gross hourly wage in their actual hours category would be the 
same in each hours category. For persons not employed in the month preceding the interview, 
gross hourly wages  are estimated by applying a two-stage estimation with a Heckman sample 
selection correction.
6 Due to item non-response wages are also missing for a non-negligible 
share of employed persons, for whom hourly wages are also imputed on the basis of these 
wage equations.  
Gross income of households is calculated by adding all income components of the 
household members. Taxable income is derived by deducting certain expenses from gross 
household income. The income tax is computed by applying the income tax function to 
taxable income of each person in the household or of the spouses’ joint income, depending on 
marital status. Income tax and employee’s social security contribution rates are deducted from 
gross income, and social transfers are added to derive net household income. Social transfers 
include child benefits, child-rearing benefits, education benefits for students, unemployment 
compensation, housing benefits and social assistance. The base year for the f ollowing analysis 
is the year 2000 as this is the last year before the tax reform.
7 Drawing on these data, we 
simulate tax payments and net household incomes on the basis of the tax legislation in 2000. 
This information serves as the basis for the analysis. Furthermore, we simulate counterfactual 
incomes and tax payments, which differ solely due to the changes in the tax function. The 
difference in the net household income between the counterfactuals and the base simulation 
measures the tax relief that is related to the different steps of the tax reform. 
 
Household Labor Supply Model 
To simulate the labor supply effects induced by the tax reform, we employ a discrete choice 
labor supply model. The main advantage of the discrete choice approach compared to 
continuous specifications derives from the possibility to model nonlinearities in budget 
constraints (see van Soest 1995, Duncan and MacCrae 1999). We model the labor supply 
decision of couple households under the assumption that both spouses jointly maximize a 
utility function in the arguments leisure of both spouses and net household income. It is 
assumed that the labor supply decisions of the household’s head and spouse can be separated 
                                        
6   In order to increase the variance of the predicted wages, we adjust the predicted wages by adding the 
normalized error term distribution of the regression of the observed wages. Estimation results for the wage 
equations are available from the authors upon request. 
7   In order to include the high-income sample we employ the data of the latest wave of the GSOEP and adjust it 
to 2000 prices.       7 
from the labor supply decision of all other household members. The labor supply decision of 
single persons can be derived as a special case of the couple’s labor supply decision. 
Following van Soest (1995), we specify a household utility function depending on the 
leisure time of the household members and net household income. We assume that the 
household’s utility index for a particular hours category  k can be modeled by the following 
translog function: 
 
(1)  k k k k k k x Ax x x U e b + + = ' ' ) (  
 
where x = (y, lm, lf)’. The components of  x are the natural logs of net household income (y), 
leisure of the husband ( lm) and leisure of the wife ( lf). These components enter the utility 
function in linear, quadratic and cross terms. The matrix  A, with elements  aij, i,j = (1,2,3), 
contains the coefficient of the quadratic and the cross terms, the vector  bj, j = (1,2,3), the 
coefficients of the linear terms. ek  is a stochastic error term accounting for unobserved factors 
that affect household utility. Given the assumption of joint maximization of household utility, 
the household will choose hours category  k if, in probability terms, the associated utility 
index, Uk, exceeds the utility index in any other possible alternative l, i.e.: 
 
(2)  ( ) ( ) [ ] k l l l l k k k l k x Ax x x Ax x P U U P e e b b - > + - + = > ' ' ' ' ) ( . 
Assuming that  ek is distributed identically across all hours categories according to an extreme-
value distribution,  the difference of the utility index between any two hours categories follows 
a logistic distribution.
8 Under this distributional assumption the probability of choosing 
alternative  k relative to alternative  l can be described by a conditional logit model introduced 
by McFadden (1973): 
(3)  , ,
) ' ' exp(
) ' ' exp(














where the summation sign is defined over all possible alternatives, i.e. hours categories. We 
control for observed heterogeneity in household preferences by including as control variables 
age and health status of both spouses, number and age of children in the household, region of 
                                        
8   The assumption that the error terms following an extreme value distribution is rather restrictive and results in 
the property of the independence of irrelevant alternatives  (IIA). Random coefficient models, in contrast to 
the conditional logit model used here, allow for unobserved heterogeneity and, therefore, circumvent the 
restrictive IIA property. Haan (2004), estimating several labor supply models with the same data set we 
employ, shows that the results (in terms of wage elasticities) from a random coefficient model do not differ 
significantly from the results obtained from a conditional logit model. Thus, for computational reasons, he 
suggests to employ the conditional logit model.    8 
residence  (east or west Germany), and  nationality. Because  variables with no variation across 
alternatives drop out of the estimation in the conditional logit model, the household-specific 
variables are interacted with the leisure terms in the utilitiy function (1). 
The specification of the econometric model is based on the assumption that each 
household compares the expected utility obtained from net income and the two spouses’ (or, 
in the case of singles, the person’s) leisure associated with the choice of a particular hours 
category.  The definition of the hours  categories is motivated by both, economic 
considerations and the actual distribution of hours in the sample. Because of the small number 
of men working part-time, only three categories could be specified for them, namely non-
employment (unemployment and non-participation in the labor force), 1 -40 hours and more 
than 40 hours (overtime). For women we specify five hours categories: non-employment, two 
part-time categories, full time and overtime (for a more detailed discussion see Steiner and 
Wrohlich 2003). 
 
4  Simulation Results 
Our discussion of the simulation results on the distributional and fiscal effects of the tax 
reform proceeds as follows. In the next section we present the distributional effects of the 
reform in terms of cash gains without accounting f or adjustments in labor supply, where we 
present results with and without taking into account pure inflation effects, i.e. bracket 
creeping. In section 4.2 we present simulation results also accounting for labor supply effects, 
and section 4.3 contains our simulation results on the fiscal effects of the tax reform.  
4.1  Distributional Effects – Without Labor Supply Adjustment 
We analyze the distributional effects of the German tax reform 2000 by calculating changes in 
net household income that result from changes in the tax function. The tax relief affects 
households differently depending on their taxable income. Without accounting for bracket 
creeping and labor supply adjustment, the yearly increase in the net household income on 
average amounts to approximately 966  €, which corresponds to a relative increase of 3.74% 
of the net household income (Table 1).  
The cash gains of the tax reform are strictly increasing in taxable income, both in 
absolute and in relative terms, and differ substantially by taxable income deciles. Not 
surprisingly, households in the three lowest deciles do not gain from the tax reform at all 
since these households were tax-exempted already before the reform. Their main sources of 
net household income are old-age pensions or social transfers, such as unemployment   9 
compensation and social assistance. For the top income decile the difference amounts to over 
6300  € per year, or to a real increase of 8.61%, mainly due to the reduction of the top 
marginal rate from 51% to 42%. As a consequence of the relative higher gains for the upper 
deciles, the Gini coefficient is increasing by 0.01 points to 0.353.  
So far, our  results correspond, at least qualitatively, to those reported by Merz and 
Zwick (2002) and Wagenhals (2000a). However, the cash gains on the left-hand side of Table 
1 do not represent the reduction of the real burden of taxation on private households. The 
German tax system is defined in nominal rather than in real terms. That implies a nominal 
increase of the taxable income leads to higher marginal tax rates, although in real terms, the 
income of the household remains unchanged. This phenomenon is known as  bracket creeping 
in the public finance literature: given progressive income taxation, inflation increases tax 
revenues, on the one side, and reduces net household income on the other side even without 
any change in real income. In order to make the households not worse off solely due to 
inflation, the government has to adjust the tax function over the years, either by reducing the 
marginal tax rates or increasing the amount of the basic tax allowance.  
As the cumulated inflation rate between 2000 and 2005 a mounts to approximately 
8.6%, this effect is certainly not negligible.
9 To calculate the real gains from the tax reform, 
we subtract the tax relief necessary to reimburse the households for the additional tax 
payments due to bracket creeping from the nominal gains attributable to the tax reform. 
Technically, we calculate the effect of bracket creeping by simulating the tax payments of 
households with inflated prices for the years 2001, 2004 and 2005, implicitly assuming no 
increase in real wages, i.e. productivity. The real increase in tax payments due to the inflated 
taxable income measures the effect of bracket creeping.  
Our simulation results show that the relative additional tax payments over the period 
2001-2005 due to bracket creeping amount to 6.8%.  Appendix I documents for single years 
the real additional tax increase attributable to bracket creeping. To offset the cumulated 
negative effect of bracket creeping over the whole period, the government would have to 
reimburse households on average by 242  €. Hence, the real gain of the tax reform for the 
average household is reduced by this amount. In absolute terms, the additional tax payments 
due to bracket creeping increase over the deciles of taxable income. As expected, the relative 
effect of bracket c reeping is highest for the households whose taxable income is close to the 
basic tax allowance and decreases with taxable income.  
                                        
9   The (cumulated) effect of inflation measured by the consumer price deflator ( Verbraucherpreisindex) 




Table 1: Cumulated impact on household income (by income deciles) 
no adjustment  for bracket kreeping  with adjustment  for bracket kreeping 
income  
decile  net income 
(2000) 
net income 




(2005)  D (in €)  D (%) 
    1  10,090  10,090  0  0.00  10,090  10,090  0  0.00 
2  13,526  13,526  0  0.00  13,526  13,526  0  0.00 
3  19,479  19,479  0  0.00  19,479  19,479  0  0.00 
4  22,751  22,899  148  0.65  22,751  22,824  73  0.32 
5  22,155  22,830  675  3.05  22,155  22,601  446  2.01 
6  26,630  27,639  1,009  3.79  26,630  27,353  724  2.72 
7  28,712  29,940  1,228  4.28  28,712  29,600  888  3.09 
8  34,298  35,888  1,590  4.64  34,298  35,445  1,147  3.34 
9  43,124  45,360  2,237  5.19  43,124  44,739  1,615  3.75 
10  73,779  80,128  6,349  8.61  73,779  79,023  5,244  7.11 
Mean  25,823  26,790  966  3.74  25,823  26,548  725  2.8 
 Gini  0.343  0.353      0.343  0.351     
Notes:   Yearly net household income in €, income deciles refer to taxable income; year of analysis: 2000; N=38,8 million households. 
Source:  GSOEP, wave S (2002), own calculations.   11
Accounting for bracket creeping, the real effects of changes in the tax function 
disaggregated by deciles of taxable income are summarized in the right-hand part of Table 1. 
The average increase of yearly net household income amounts to 725  €. This implies a 
relative increase of 2.8%. By deciles, the distribution of relative gains is s imilar to the results 
derived from the previous analysis. The relative gains are increasing in the taxable incomes. 
Yet, it is important to stress that for all households with a taxable income above the tax 
allowance, bracket creeping effect reduces the absolute and relative increase. Controlling for 
bracket creeping, the inequality in the income distribution is slightly reduced, as the Gini 
coefficient indicates. This does not surprise since the lowest deciles are not affect by the 
impact of bracket creeping.   
4.2  Distributional Effects – Accounting for Labor Supply Adjustment 
One purpose of the tax reform is to increase work incentives by reducing tax distortions 
imbedded in the German tax system. Since changes in employment may have important 
effects on the  income distribution, it is of great importance for our distributional analysis 
whether the tax reform leads in fact to an increase of labor supply and, if so, for which groups 
of households. 
For the estimation of the labor supply model we restrict our sample to household 
members who are not pensioners and not in any sort of schooling, training or university. Also 
self-employed people and civil servants are excluded since these groups might differ in their 
labor supply behavior.
10 We run separate estimations  for couple households, single men and 
single women. For technical reasons, we further divide couple households in three groups, 
those where both spouses are assumed to be flexible regarding their labor supply behavior 
(i.e. both spouses are neither pensioners, nor students, nor in maternity leave, nor civil 
servants or self-employed), those where only the husband is assumed to be flexible and those 
where only the wife is assumed to be flexible. In total we estimate labor supply responses for 
7,494 households. Due to the above-mentioned restrictions 3,570 households are assumed to 
have an inelastic labor supply.  
On average, estimated elasticities of working hours with respect to a 1% change in the 
real wage derived from our labor supply model described in section 3 above are about 0.3 for 
                                        
10   It is certainly problematic to exclude self-employed when estimating the impact of the tax reform on labor 
supply. This group might be seen as the most flexible with respect to labor supply. However the used data 
provide not sufficient information about the self-employed. Including behavioural effects of this group 
remains for future work.   12
women and 0.2 for men (see Appendix 2).
11 These estimates are in the range of typical cross-
section estimates from studies for other OECD countries (see e.g. Fuchs, Krueger and 
Porterba 1998, Blundell and MaCurdy 1999). Although these average elasticities are not very 
large, the effect of the tax reform on labor supply may be substantial given the relative large 
reductions in marginal tax rates and its effect on net household incomes documented above. 
As the following figure i llustrates, changes in the marginal tax burden, which indicate the 
increasing work incentive due to the tax reform, differ by income deciles. The work incentive 
effect is particularly strong for higher income groups as the top marginal tax rate is reduced 
by 9 percentage points to 42%.  
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Source:  GSOEP, wave S (2002), own calculations. 
 
Labor Supply Adjustment 
Before analyzing the distributional impact of changes in households labor supply, we provide 
detailed information about the labor supply effects implied by the tax reform. The quantitative 
implications of the tax reform can best be described by deriving hours and participation 
elasticities with respect to changes in the tax function. Although a closed-form expression of 
elasticities is not available for the utility function estimated in our specification of the 
household labor supply model, elasticities can be calculated from the simulated changes in 
                                        
11   Estimation results for the household utility model are available form the authors upon request. For further 
methodological discussion related to the estimation of these elasticities see Haan (2004).   13
estimated hours and participation rates induced by  changes in the tax function. The expected 
number of hours worked as well as the labor force participation rates are calculated for each 
sample observation both on the basis of the tax function in 2000 and using the changed tax 
functions. The difference of  these numbers provides the estimated effects of the tax reform in 
terms of elasticities of both participation rates and working hours. These elasticities combine 
the effects of both the change in net household incomes of a particular group resulting from 
the tax reform and the size of the labor supply response of a particular household type to a 
given percentage change of net household income. 
Table 3 summarizes simulated labor supply elasticities resulting from the cumulated 
effect of the tax reform, i.e. over the period 2000 - 2005. Elasticities derived from the first and 
the second steps of the reform are documented in Appendix III and IV.  
Table 3: Cumulated labor supply elasticities by gender, household type, and region 
  couples, both spouses 
flexible 
couples, only one spouse 
flexible 
singles 
  women  men  women  men  women  men 
  change in the participation rate (in percentage points) 
             











(0.24-0.81)   









(0.05-0.38)   
0.48 
(0.21-0.77) 









(0.04-0.32)   
0.64 
(0.31-0.97)   
             
  change in total hours worked (in percent) 
             

































(0.08-0.79)   
1.1 
(0.55-1.66) 
             
Note:  Numbers in parentheses refer to 95-percent bootstrap confidence intervals (1000 repetitions). 
Source:  GSOEP, wave S (2002), own calculations. 
 
Estimated elasticities are all positive and statistically significant.
12 Elasticities vary between 
the groups, yet, according to the bootstrapped confidence intervals, the differences are 
statistically not significant in most cases. The reason that the average participation elasticity 
for men is higher than for women is related to larger changes in their net income due to the 
                                        
12   For about 90% of the sample the first derivatives with respect to income and both leisure terms are positive, 
i.e. the theoretical restrictions of a well-behaved utility function are fulfilled in the great majority of cases.    14
tax reform. In general, taxable income of men is above the average and, therefore, men benefit 
more from the tax reform than women. As shown in Table 3, labor supply elasticities 
resulting from the tax reform differ little between east and West Germany, which may be 
related to various factors. First, since h ousehold income in west Germany is on average still 
substantially higher than in the east, west Germans benefit more from the reduction in 
marginal tax rates. However, this effect is reduced by the indirect effects resulting from the 
system of income splitting of married couples in Germany. A reduction in marginal tax rates 
reduces the advantage of income splitting. As Steiner and Wrohlich (2003) show, west 
German couples benefit much more from the system of income splitting. Second, as the labor 
supply elasticities derived from a 1% in wages indicate (see Appendix II), labor supply is 
more elastic in west Germany.  
Population-weighted estimates of the effects of the tax reform on labor force 
participation and on hours of work for Germany as a whole are summarized in Table 4.  







after the reform 
total hours effect 
(per week) 







number of full 
time 
equivalents  
due to the tax 
reform 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
women  72 
 (58-86) 
3,272 








men  64 
 (54-73) 
3,405 






































Note:  Numbers in parentheses refer to 95-percent bootstrap confidence intervals (1000 repetitions). The 
confidence intervals of the sums were computed by calculating a weighted average of the percentage 
deviation of the bounds of the confidence intervals from the mean. 
Source:  GSOEP, wave S (2002), own calculations. 
 
Although bootstrapped confidence bands are unfortunately quite large, simulated aggregate 
labor supply elasticities are significantly positive for all groups shown in Table 4. Hence, the 
tax reform will unambiguously lead to an increase of labor supply. In total, the participation 
effect amounts to about 160,000 people, where women and men provide contribute roughly 
equally. The additional supply of working hours amounts to approximately 8 million 
additional hours. Since part-time employment is common among women while the majority   15
of men works full-time or even overtime, a larger share of this additional hours effect is 
accounted for by men. 
Following the method suggested by McDonald and Moffit (1980), the total hours 
effect can be decomposed into a conditional hours effect and a participation effect. As the 
decomposition in Table 4 (columns 3 and 4) shows, the participation effect is much larger 
than the conditional hours effect. A bout two thirds of the additional hours are supplied by 
persons who have not been participating in the labor market before the tax reform. The 
participation effect predominates for all groups. For the reason given above, it is relatively 
large for men.  
The last column of Table 4 presents the additional full time equivalents resulting from 
the participation effect. Dividing the number of hours due to additional participation by 38.5 
hours, we calculate that the tax reform results in additional labor supply  of 150,000 full time 
equivalents. The number of full time equivalents exceeds the total participation effect in 
column (1) for women, whereas for men the reverse holds.  These gender differences result 
from differences in average working hours between men  and women already referred to 
above.  
The estimated labor supply effects induced by the tax reform are derived under the 
assumption that the market wage stays constant. Assuming a downward-sloping labor demand 
curve, an increase in labor supply will lead to a lower market wage, reducing the labor supply 
effect. By the same token, if wages are inflexible only parts of the additional supply will 
result in additional employment. Both effects reduce household incomes and thus the positive 
labor supply effects o f the tax reform derived in this section. Depending on the size of the 
labor supply effect, this so called third-round effect of a tax reform would have to be 
considered to estimate the overall effect of the policy reform (e.g., Duncan and Creedy 2001), 
but for the time being we ignore this third-round effect.  
 
The Impact of Behavioral Adjustment on the Income Distribution 
Using our simulation results from the previous subsection we can now analyze the 
distributional effects of the tax reform also accounting for the labor supply effects induced by 
the reform, which are known as second-round effects in the microsimulation literature (see 
e.g. Duncan and Creedy 2001). Simulation results for this second-round analysis are 
summarized in Tables 5 and 6. Appendix V documents the results of the distributional 
analysis for the first and second step of the reform.    16
As household's labor supply is increasing, the new simulated net household income on 
basis of the tax function 2005 exceeds the net household income assuming inelastic labor 
supply.
13 On average, the increase in labor supply results in an increase in the net household 
income by 126  €. In general, the analysis of the distributional effects including second round 
effects supports the conclusion derived above. Absolute and relative gains due to the tax 
reform a re increasing in taxable income: in the 10
th decile the increase amounts to over 5,300 
€ per year (7.2%), compared to about 1% in the lower deciles.  







D (in €)  D (%) 
1  10,090  10,231  140  1.39 
2  13,526  13,647  122  0.90 
3  19,479  19,610  131  0.67 
4  22,751  22,950  199  0.87 
5  22,155  22,724  569  2.57 
6  26,630  27,486  857  3.22 
7  28,712  29,734  1,021  3.56 
8  34,298  35,578  1,280  3.73 
9  43,124  44,853  1,730  4.01 
10  73,779  79,091  5,312  7.20 
Mean  25,823  26,674  851  3.29  
Gini  0.343  0.350     
Notes:   Yearly net household income in €, income deciles refer to taxable income; year of analysis: 2000; 
N=38,8 million households. 
Source:   GSOEP, wave S (2002), own calculations. 
 
Taking into account labor supply adjustment thus increases net household income in 
the highest decile by about 70  € in comparison to the analysis without any behavioral 
adjustment. More important, however, is the impact of increased labor supply in the lower 
deciles of the income distribution.
14 As shown in Table 1, not accounting for behavioral 
adjustments these groups’ net household incomes were not affected by the tax reform because 
they did not pay taxes already before the reform. However, these households additional labor 
supply induced by the tax reform will result in higher net household incomes. This effect is 
particularly strong for the households in the lowest income decile, as the increase in gross 
                                        
13   It is important to stress that the comparison is based on analyses both accounting for the effect of bracket 
creeping. 
14   The calculation assumes that means tested benefits for these households remain constant.   17
earnings will not s hift them above the basic tax allowance. Thus, for these households 
additional earnings will remain untaxed.  
The behavioral change of the households in the lower deciles affects overall income 
inequality, although only modestly. In comparison to the pre-tax reform distribution, the Gini 
coefficient increases by 0.07 points. Taking into account labor supply responses the Gini 
coefficient slightly declines from 0.351 to 0.350. The increase in net household income in the 
lower deciles thus implies a marginally more equal income distribution.  
 
Impact of the Tax Reform on the Income Distribution of Different Groups 
Differences in cash gains of the tax reform, accounting for bracket creeping and labor supply 
effects, are summarized in Table 6, where we distinguish by region, marital status, and the 
number of children living in a household.  
Differentiated by marital status, the increase in household incomes for singles is lower 
than for couples. That is related to differences in taxable income, as people with higher 
incomes are more likely to be non-singles. The higher effect for non-married couples 
compared to married couples is related to the income splitting in the German tax system. As 
non-married couples do not benefit from the income splitting the reduction  of marginal taxes 
has a higher effect for their net incomes than if they were married (Steiner and Wrohlich 
2003).  
Differences in cash gains between east and west Germany are also important. Whereas 
west German households gain on average 3.47% of their net households, the income for 
households in the eastern part increases only by 2.29%. Again, this is due to the still 
important income difference between the eastern and western part of Germany. 
The effects of the tax reform also differ by the number of children living in a 
household. However, as the results indicate there is no clear relationship between the number 
of children and the cash gains of the reform. The largest relative increase in net incomes 
occurs in households with two children, both in east  and west Germany. In contrast, cash 
gains are relatively small for households with three or more children. This is not surprising 
since the tax reform was not intended to support large families. To improve the situation of 
households with children the government has launched an additional law to increase child 
benefits. However, this reform is not directly linked to the changes in the tax function and is 
thus not attributable to the German tax reform 2000 and, therefore, not explicitly taken into 
account in our calculation of the distributional effects of the tax reform.    18
Table 6: Real cumulated impact on net household incomes – second round effects by region, 






D (in €)  D (%) 
Germany  25,823  26,674  851  3.29  
single  16,804  17,384  581  3.46 
non married couple  31,534  32,678  1,144  3.63 
married couple  34,000  35,079  1,080  3.18 
no children  22,703  23,449  746  3.29 
1 child  28,904  29,830  926  3.21 
2 children  37,425  38,766  1,341  3.58 
3 or more children  37,002  38,042  1,040  2.81 
West Germany  26,868  27,802  934  3.47 
single  17,546  18,200  653  3.72 
non married couple  33,824  35,143  1,319  3.90 
married couple  35,176  36,340  1,164  3.31 
no children  23,750  24,585  835  3.52 
1 child  29,951  30,955  1,004  3.35 
2 children  38,291  39,689  1,398  3.65 
3 or more children  37,824  38,928  1,104  2.92 
East Germany   21,264  21,751  487  2.29 
single  13,555  13,818  263  1.94 
non married couple  24,799  25,429  630  2.54 
married couple  28,572  29,264  693  2.42 
no children  18,066  18,418  352  1.95 
1 child  25,223  25,877  653  2.59 
2 children  33,403  34,478  1,075  3.22 
3 or more children  30,608  31,151  543  1.77 
Notes:   Yearly net household income in €, income deciles refer to taxable income; year of analysis: 2000; 
N=38,8 million households. 
Source:   GSOEP, wave S (2002), own calculations. 
 
Although the impact of the tax reform varies substantially by region, marital  status and 
number of children, the effect of the variation within these groups on the change in overall 
inequality is much greater than the effect of the between-group variation. This is revealed by a 
decomposition of the Theil index, which is a decomposable measure of inequality (see, e.g., 
Cowell 1995).  Accounting for bracket creeping and labor supply effects, our simulations 
show an increase in the Theil index from 0.209 before the tax function to 0.222 after the 
reform indicating an increase in inequality associated with the tax reform. Our decomposition 
analysis shows that the major share of the increase in the Theil index is due to an increase in 
inequality  within groups, irrespective of whether the decomposition is based on region,   19
marital status or  the number of children, whereas only a negligible share of the increase in 
inequality is attributable to changes in inequality between groups. 
15 
4.3  Fiscal Effects 
An important indicator for the analysis of fiscal effects is the elasticity of taxation. This 
elasticity measures the relative increase in tax revenues to a one percent change in taxable 
income and is given as the ratio of the marginal to the average income tax rate. Both, the size 
of this elasticity and its change induced by the tax reform varies markedly with taxable 
income, as illustrated by the following figure. 
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Source:  GSOEP, wave S (2002), own calculations 
 
Overall, the elasticity of taxation is increasing due to the tax reform. Assuming the tax 
function of the year 2000, we estimate an elasticity of 1,55 (median) and of 1,65 (median) for 
2005. This positive change results from the reduction of the average tax rate associated with 
the higher basic tax allowance. Therefore, for lower income groups the elasticity of taxation is 
increasing.  In contrast, for households with taxable incomes above 55,000  € the tax reform 
reduces the elasticity of taxation because the reduction of the highest marginal tax rate 
outweighs the higher basic tax allowance. This has a large effect on total tax revenues, given 
high-incomes households pay the major share of income taxes. It seems likely that these 
                                        
15   Detailed results of this decomposition analysis may be obtained form the authors on request.   20
losses in tax revenues will only partially be compensated by additional tax revenues resulting 
form the positive labor supply effects of the tax reform described in the previous section. 
In Table 7 we summarize our simulation results of the fiscal effects of the tax reform 
taking into account labor supply effects but  not adjusting tax revenues for bracket creeping 
because the focus here is on the impact of the tax reform on public budgets. Following 
microsimulation terminology, we will refer to the simulated fiscal effects without adjustment 
for labor supply adjustment as “static”, and to those accounting for labor supply adjustment as 
“behavioral”.  
Table 7:   Tax revenue estimates – with and without accounting for labor supply effects 
  2000  2001  2004  2005 
    static  behavioural  static  behavioral  static  behavioral 
1  0  0  152  0  269  0  371 
2  0  0  117  0  195  0  263 
3  0  0  113  0  196  0  255 
4  1,690  1,410  1,520  1,090  1,260  1,050  1,300 
5  9,670  8,490  8,590  7,210  7,380  7,060  7,280 
6  16,600  15,000  15,100  13,200  13,400  12,900  13,100 
7  25,000  23,000  23,100  21,000  21,200  20,500  20,800 
8  34,200  31,800  31,900  29,500  29,700  28,800  29,100 
9  43,000  40,300  40,400  37,800  37,900  36,700  36,900 
10  83,500  79,500  79,500  74,700  74,700  71,000  71,100 
mean  213,660  199,500  200,492  184,500  186,200  178,010  180,469 
Notes:   Tax revenue in million  €, income deciles refer to taxable income; year of analysis: 2000; N=38,8 
million households. 
Source:    GSOEP, wave S (2002), own calculations. 
 
Based on the tax function of the year 2000, we simulate an overall tax revenue of the personal 
income tax of nearly 214 billion  €. The distribution of the tax revenue over the households 
stresses the necessity of considering the high-income households when discussing changes in 
the tax legislation. Households in the highest decile provide nearly 40% of the total tax 
revenue. On the opposite, the lower 50% of the income distribution contribute only 5% of the 
revenue of the personal income tax. Assuming no behavioral effects due to the tax reform, we 
calculate a total loss of tax revenue of about 35,7 billion €. Both, the first and the second step 
reduce the total amount of tax each by about 14 billion  €. The last step has only a minor 
impact of about 6 billion €. 
Comparing the tax revenues derived by simulation with and without adjusted labor 
supply, the additional tax revenues due to increasing economic activity can be calculated. As 
labor supply measures only parts of economic activity this difference must be interpreted as   21
lower bound estimate.
16 The total loss in tax revenue is reduced to 33 billion  € when 
accounting for the additional tax income that results from increasing labor supply. That 
implies the financial loss is by more than 2 billon  € lower assuming the estimated labor 
supply effects can be realized. The relative increase in tax revenue is highest for the lower 
deciles as these households have been exempted from taxation before the behavioral 
adjustment. The additional tax revenues of the lower three deciles amounts to about 900 
million €.   
 
5  Summary and Conclusions 
It was the purpose of our study to provide empirical evidence about the distributional and 
fiscal effects of the personal income tax reform in Germany. As the tax reform will not be 
fully implemented before the year 2005, we employ an ex ante analysis based on a behavioral 
microsimulation model. The major advantage of our data base (GSOEP) is that it includes for 
the first time a disproportionately large high-income sample of German households. As we 
demonstrate, this group contributes the major share of the income tax and is therefore 
essential  when analyzing the impact of changes in the tax function. In contrast to previous 
studies on the tax reform, we control for bracket creeping and include behavioral adjustment 
of households by estimating a household labor supply model.  
  Our simulation results show that the total effect of the tax reform on the net 
households income amounts on average to 850 €, which implies a relative increase of 3.29%. 
Cash gains of the tax reform are strictly increasing, both in absolute and in relative terms, in 
the level of taxable income implying an increase in income inequality as a consequence of the 
tax reform. Disaggregated by region, family status and number of children, we find that 
households living in west Germany, couple households and households with two children 
benefit most from the tax reform. However, most of the increase in inequality is related to 
changes in inequality within rather than between these groups. The mentioned total effect of 
the tax reform on the distribution of incomes takes into account bracket creeping and labor 
supply effects. Controlling for bracket creeping reduces the real value of cash gains markedly, 
and also slightly reduces inequality since households in the lowest part of the income 
distribution are not affected by bracket creeping. Accounting for positive labor supply effects 
induced by the tax reform increases cash gains of the tax reform and reduces income 
                                        
16   In addition, economic activity has a positive impact not only on the personal income tax but as well on other 
taxes such as the consumption tax.    22
inequality since behavioral effects are relatively strong for households in the lower part of the 
income distribution. 
 
  Regarding  the fiscal effects of the reform, we estimate the tax reform induces a total 
loss in personal income tax revenue by about 33 billion  €. As the labor supply estimation 
indicates, additional participation and hours of work reduce the revenue loss by 
approximately 2 billion  €. Thus, the optimistic view that the tax reform is to a large part “self-
financing” by increased work incentives seems largely unwarranted. However, we may 
underestimate the positive budgetary effects of the tax reform since we could not t ake into 
account several other potential behavioral effects of the reform due to lack of sufficient 
information.  As stressed by Feldstein (1995) and the “new tax responsiveness” literature, 
labor supply effect of cuts in tax rates may only account for a r elatively small part of the 
overall effect on taxable income, especially for people in the upper part of the income 
distribution who contribute a large share of the income tax. This is likely to be of particular 
relevance for the self-employed for whom we could not estimate any behavioral effects due to 
data restrictions.  
On the other hand, our estimated labor supply effects might be seen as an upper bound 
since we have not considered third-round effects of the tax reform resulting from either a 
wage reduction required to absorb the increased labor supply or, in case of rigid wages, a 
lower employment effects than we have estimated.    23
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Appendix I: Impact of Bracket Creeping 
 
 Additional tax payments due to bracket creeping (by income deciles) 
   2001  2004  2005 
  D (in €)  D (in %)  D (in €)  D (in %)  D (in €)  D (in %) 
1  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00 
2  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00 
3  0  0.00  0  0.00  0  0.00 
4  22  5.10  61  14.19  74  17.33 
5  74  2.89  192  7.53  229  8.99 
6  92  2.00  239  5.22  285  6.24 
7  109  1.58  284  4.12  340  4.94 
8  140  1.40  369  3.68  443  4.42 
9  197  1.29  518  3.40  621  4.08 
10  353  0.83  921  2.17  1.105  2.60 
mean  77  2.2 202 5.6  242 6.8 
Notes:   Additional tax payments in €, income deciles refer to taxable income; year of analysis: 2000; N=38.8 
million households. 




Appendix II: Labor Supply Elasticities 
Labor supply effects of a 1% increase in gross wages (2000) 
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0.18 
 (0.09-0.28) 





















  (0.02-0.24) 
0.43 
 (0.08-0.25) 
             
Note:  Numbers in parentheses refer to 95-percent bootstrap confidence intervals (1000 repetitions). 
Source:   GSOEP, wave S (2002), own calculations. 
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Appendix III: Elasticities resulting form tax function 2001  
 
Labor Supply Elasticities  
  couples. both spouses 
flexible 
couples. only one spouse 
flexible 
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  change in the participation rate (in percentage points) 
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(0.04-0.47)   
0.56 
(0.28-0.85) 
             
Note:  Numbers in parentheses refer to 95-percent bootstrap confidence intervals (500 repetitions). 
Source:    GSOEP, wave S (2002), own calculations. 
 
 







after the reform 
total hours effect 
(per week) 







number of full 
time 
equivalents  
due to the tax 
reform 
women  31  1,532  888  644  23 
couples 
men  32  1,653  1,334  318  35 
women  5  291  174  117  5 
singles 
men  10  526  408  117  11 
sums    78  4,002  2,804  1,196  73 
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Appendix IV: Elasticities resulting form tax function 2004  
 
Labor Supply Elasticities  
  couples. both spouses 
flexible 
couples. only one spouse 
flexible 
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  change in the participation rate (in percentage points) 
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0.70 
(0.34-1.06) 
             
Note:  Numbers in parentheses refer to 95-percent bootstrap confidence intervals (500 repetitions). 













after the reform 
total hours effect 
(per week) 







number of full 
time 
equivalents  
due to the tax 
reform 
women  54  2,686  1,592  1,094  41 
couples 
men  60  3,071  2,502  568  65 
women  10  536  323  213  8 
singles 
men  18  949  735  214  19 
sums    142  7,242  5,152  2,089  134 












Appendix V: Distributional Effects of the First and Second Step  
 







D (in €)  D (%) 
1  10,090  10,146  56  0.55% 
2  13,526  13,578  52  0.38% 
3  19,479  19,534  56  0.29% 
4  22,751  22,846  94  0.41% 
5  22,155  22,438  283  1.28% 
6  26,630  27,034  404  1.52% 
7  28,712  29,209  497  1.73% 
8  34,298  34,925  626  1.83% 
9  43,124  43,932  809  1.88% 
10  73,779  75,515  1,736  2.35% 
Mean  25,823  26,185  362  1.40 % 
Gini  0.343  0.345     
Notes:   Yearly net household income in €, income deciles refer to taxable income; year of analysis: 2000; 
N=38,8 million households. 
Source:  GSOEP, wave S (2002), own calculations. 
 







D (in €)  D (%) 
1  10,090  10,178  87  0.87% 
2  13,526  13,620  95  0.70% 
3  19,479  19,576  98  0.50% 
4  22,751  22,933  182  0.80% 
5  22,155  22,693  539  2.43% 
6  26,630  27,427  797  2.99% 
7  28,712  29,630  918  3.20% 
8  34,298  35,421  1,122  3.27% 
9  43,124  44,556  1,433  3.32% 
10  73,779  77,430  3,651  4.95% 
Mean  25,823  26,513  690  2.67 % 
Gini  0.343  0.348     
Notes:   Yearly net household income in €, income deciles refer to taxable income; year of analysis: 2000; 
N=38,8 million households. 
Source:    GSOEP, wave S (2002), own calculations. 
 